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Attorney-Client. Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263 (R.I. 1995).
The attorney-client and work-product privileges apply to an attor-
ney's subordinate and are not per se waived by the presence of a
third party during privileged communications.1
In Rosati v. Kuzman,2 the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated
that if a person can be categorized as an agent, or "subordinate" of
an attorney, and if the attorney-client privilege is not waived, the
subordinate cannot divulge any information deemed privileged by
the attorney-client and work-product doctrines. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Rosati, a criminal suspect in Florida,4 retained the services of
Rhode Island lawyer John F. Cicilline (Cicilline).5 Prior to hiring
Cicilline, Kenneth Kuzman (Kuzman), a former high school wres-
tling coach of Rosati, offered his services to Rosati's parents and
was subsequently introduced to Cicilline. 6 Rosati's parents played
an integral role in Rosati's defense and were present in meetings
1. The attorney-client privilege protects the communications between an at-
torney and client. Upjohn Company v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981).
An attorney should have all the facts in order to give the client sound advice. Id. at
391. Keeping communications confidential between attorney and client advances
full disclosure of facts in order to give this sound advice. Id. "It is well established
that 'the attorney-cient privilege protects from disclosure only the confidential
communications between a client and his or her attorney.'" Callahan v. Nystedt,
641 A.2d 58, 61 (R.I. 1994) (quoting State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1004 (R.I.
1984)). "The general rule is that communications made by a client to his attorney
for the purpose of seeking professional advice, as well as the responses by the at-
torney to such inquiries, are privileged communications not subject to disclosure.'"
Id. (quoting von Bulow, 475 A.2d at 1004). However, the rule must be narrowly
construed and a relationship between an attorney and a client does not give rise to
the privilege. Id. The court should, nonetheless, presume the relationship was for
obtaining legal advice. Williams v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 143 A.2d 324,
337 (R.I. 1958). See, also, Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules, Art. V. § 1.6 (1995);
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 4 (1969).
2. 660 A.2d 263 (R.I. 1995).
3. Id. at 264-69.
4. Rosati was indicted by a Broward County, Florida grand jury on Septem-
ber 12, 1990 for murder and armed robbery stemming from Rosati's activities in
Florida. Id. at 264.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 264-269.
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between Rosati and Cicilline. 7  Eventually, Cicilline asked
Kuzman to perform certain jobs in connection with the
investigation.8
Subsequent to Kuzman's connection with the case, the Florida
indictments against Rosati were dismissed and indictments were
returned against two other individuals for the same crimes. 9
When Kuzman was notified to appear for a deposition in connec-
tion with one of the new indictments, Rosati was concerned that
Kuzman might divulge privileged information during this deposi-
tion.10 Subsequently, Rosati filed a complaint and a request for
declaratory and injunctive relief in Rhode Island Superior Court.11
The superior court granted the injunction requested.' 2 On ap-
peal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Kuzman contended that
the trial justice erred by, (1) finding that Kuzman was an agent of
Cicilline, (2) failing to find that the attorney-client relationship
was destroyed by the presence of Rosati's parents during attorney-
client conferences, (3) failing to find that the attorney-client privi-
lege was waived by the disclosure of confidential information to a
third party, and (4) issuing an overbroad order.13
BACKGROUND
In State v. von Bulow, 14 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the burden of establishing the attorney-client privilege is on
the party seeking to protect the confidential information. 15 Under
7. Id. at 267. Rosati's parents retained Cicilline and accepted Kuzman's
assistance, and were Rosati's confidants. Id.
8. Kuzman interviewed witnesses, assisted private investigators, and made
trips to Florida in connection with Rosati's case. Id. at 264. He was also author-
ized by Cicilline to divulge certain information to F.B.I. agents and Florida author-
ities and was authorized by Rosati to contact literary agents. Id.
9. Id.
10. Rosati, 660 A.2d at 264.
11. Rosati sought an injunction prohibiting Kuzman from disclosing any infor-
mation that was privileged under the attorney-client and work-product doctrines.
Id. at 265.
12. Id. The trial justice found Kuzman to be an agent of Cicilline and enjoined
Kuzman from disclosing any information that was protected by the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine. Id.
13. Id.
14. 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984).
15. The court in von Bulow held that in order to establish the attorney-client
privilege, the party seeking to invoke the privilege must satisfy the following
elements:
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von Bulow, the attorney-client privilege applies to an attorney's
subordinates. 16 In order to be classified as an attorney's
subordinate, an agency relationship between the subordinate and
the attorney must be demonstrated. 17
Once the attorney-client privilege is established, it is not per
se waived by the disclosure of confidential communications to a
third party.' 8 However, the attorney-client privilege may be
waived by selectively choosing what to divulge.' 9
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The court first held that an agency relationship existed be-
tween Cicilline and Kuzman.20 The facts established that Rosati
had fulfilled his burden of proving that an attorney-client relation-
ship existed between Rosati and Kuzman. 2 1 It was clear that Cicil-
line at all times directed Kuzman in his duties and was in
"(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2)
the person to whom the communication was made (a) is [a] member of a
bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this comnuni-
cation is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence
of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing either (i) an opinion of law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d)
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client." Id. at 1004-05.
16. Id. at 1005.
17. Rosati, 660 A.2d at 265. The court has held that the agent/subordinate
relationship is established by the existence of"(1) a manifestation by the principal
that the agent will act for him, (2) acceptance by the agent of the undertaking, and
(3) an agreement between the parties that the principal will be in control of the
undertaking." Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864, 867 (R.I. 1987);
See also Jameson v. Hawthorne, 635 A.2d 1167, 1171 (R.I. 1994); Narragansett
Wire Co. v. Norberg, 376 A.2d 1, 5 (R.I. 1977). See also Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 14 (1958) ("A principle has the right to control the conduct of the agent
with respect to matters entrusted to him.").
18. Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir. 1984) (if a third party is
present at a privileged communication, the issue is "whether the client reasonably
understood the conference to be confidential."); von Bulow, 475 A.2d at 1007 (in
order for the attorney-client privilege to be waived when information is divulged to
some third-party by assent of the parties, there must be evidence that the informa-
tion is privileged). Cf State v. Driscoll, 360 A.2d 857, 861 (R.I. 1976) (if the third
party is not an agent of either the attorney or the client the communication is not
confidential).
19. von Bulow, 475 A.2d at 1007 (one cannot only claim the privilege for infor-
mation damaging to that party's side while divulging what is helpful to its case).
20. Rosati, 660 A.2d at 265.
21. Id.
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control. 22 Further, Kuzman's testimony demonstrated that he ac-
cepted his role of an assistant to Cicilline. 23 Lastly, the court
noted evidence of an implicit agreement that Cicilline was in con-
trol of Kuzman by Cicilline's own testimony.24
Next, the court held that the presence of Rosati's parents dur-
ing communications between Cicilline and Rosati did not waive the
attorney-client privilege. 25 The court explained that the intention
of the client is the proper focus, and that the identities of third
parties are irrelevant to the analysis.26 Further, Cicilline's author-
ization of Kuzman to communicate with the F.B.I. and Florida au-
thorities, as well as Rosati's authorization of Kuzman to contact
literary agents, did not mean the attorney-client privilege had
been waived since the record was void of any evidence that any of
the authorized disclosures were of confidential material.27 The
record was further void of any evidence that the privilege was se-
lectively invoked by Cicilline or Rosati.28 Lastly, the court held
that the order issued by the superior court was not impermissibly
vague, since expanding the scope of the superior court's order
would risk divulging the very information it sought to protect.29
CONCLUSION
The most important result of Rosati is its synthesis of the law
of agency and the attorney-client privilege. The court makes it
quite clear that an agent of a retained lawyer will be bound by the
attorney-client privilege just as the retained lawyer is. Addition-
ally, waiver of the attorney-client privilege is to be determined by
22. Id. at 266.
23. Id. Kuzman testified". . . I have assisted Jack [Cicilline] in putting this
case together." Id.
24. Id. Kuzman, representing himself at the hearing, asked Cicilline if Cicil-
line "ever authorize[d]" Kuzman to speak with the F.B.I. about the case, to which
Ciciline answered,"... I did say its okay to go to talk to the F.B.I. about it." Id.
25. Rosati, 660 A.2d at 266.
26. Id. at 266-67 (The fact that his parents played a vital role in the defense of
the case and were confidants to Rosati showed that Rosati intended for the commu-
nications to remain confidential). See State v. Juarez, 570 A.2d 1118, 1120.
27. Rosati, 660 A.2d at 267-68.
28. Id. at 268.
29. Id. at 269. The order stated that Kuzman could not discuss anything that
had not already been disclosed by Rosati and that the attorney-client privilege pro-
tected anything that Kuzman had learned while acting as an agent of Cicilline. Id.
at 267-68.
1996] SURVEY SECTION 219
the client's reasonable belief about the nature of the communica-
tion sought to be protected.
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